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introduction
The past few decades have witnessed a dramatic renewal of interest in the
natural law tradition within philosophical circles after years of relative neglect.1
This natural law renaissance, however, has yet to bear much fruit within
American constitutional discourse, especially among commentators on the left.2
At the same time, some contemporary progressive constitutional theorists have
begun to complain about the inadequacy of the conceptual tools at their
disposal to discuss the interface between their moral and constitutional
commitments. Robin West, for example, has recently argued that within
contemporary liberal constitutional scholarship, “[t]here is almost nothing . . .
about the possible constitutional grounding of the moral duties, whether
enumerated or unenumerated, of either federal or state legislators to legislate,
or to do so in particular ways, or toward particular ends.”3 Related to West’s
observation, there is an increasing tendency within progressive political circles
to bemoan the absence of a vocabulary with which to articulate the moral
grounds for the left’s political agenda.4 The natural law tradition would seem
to provide a great deal of what these commentators find lacking in current
progressive political and legal discussions: rich concepts and language with
which to probe the moral character and legitimacy of constitutional law and
government action (or inaction). The failure of these constitutional theorists to

1.

2.

3.
4.
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For some major recent philosophical works exploring the natural law tradition, see JOHN
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); PHILIPPA FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS
(2001); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY
(1993); ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999); ANTHONY J. LISSKA, AQUINAS’S
THEORY OF NATURAL LAW: AN ANALYTIC RECONSTRUCTION (1996); and ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988).
See Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Moral Point of View, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND
MORALITY 195, 196 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) (discussing the limited influence of
contemporary natural law thinking).
Robin West, Unenumerated Duties, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at
4, on file with author). TK Month
See, e.g., Geoffrey Nunberg, Speech Impediments, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 1, 2004, at 45, 47
(“Recapturing the language of morality is the most important single step in refashioning a
new progressive rhetoric, one free of the technocratic jargon for which Democrats have had
a lamentable penchant in the past.”). This complaint from political observers is connected to
West’s complaint because, as Robert Post and Reva Siegel have argued, constitutional
jurisprudence derives strength and coherence from its interaction with popular political
discourse. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 571 (2006) (“[C]onstitutional law is made in
continuous dialogue with political culture.”). Post and Siegel argue that progressive
constitutional jurisprudence will not be revived until the left learns to reconnect its
jurisprudential vision with a broader discourse of progressive politics. See id. at 569-75.
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embrace—or even to really engage with—the natural law tradition, however,
reflects its marginal and—at least among progressives—deeply suspect status.5
In light of its low profile within contemporary constitutional debates, an
effort to formulate a natural law constitutionalism is almost by definition an
event worthy of sustained attention. In Restoring the Lost Constitution, Randy
Barnett draws heavily upon a natural law theory of constitutional legitimacy to
argue in favor of a radically libertarian reading of the Constitution.6 His
position is creatively and engagingly argued and has the potential to reshape
the terms of debate on any number of issues. It is therefore unsurprising that
Barnett’s book has garnered significant attention, both inside the academy and
beyond. Steven Calabresi has compared its significance to Richard Epstein’s
landmark work, Takings.7 And since its publication, Restoring the Lost
Constitution has been the subject of a seemingly endless stream of blog
discussions.8 Barnett’s important book, and the substantial commentary it has
generated, may well help to foster interest in natural law constitutionalism.
At least part of the progressive aversion to natural law theory, however, is
likely rooted in a persistent hunch that there is something inherently
conservative about natural law reasoning. It is hard to blame recent observers
for forming that opinion. The most prominent of the “new” natural law
theorists, after all, have expended enormous energy advocating expansive legal
codification of a decidedly “old” sexual morality.9 Princeton’s Robert George,
for example, has enthusiastically defended—on natural law grounds—laws
criminalizing private, consensual homosexual conduct.10 And John Finnis has
deployed natural law arguments in defense of laws prohibiting the distribution

5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.

See Weinreb, supra note 2, at 196 (calling natural law “marginalized”).
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
82-83 (2004).
See Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply
to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1081-82 (2005).
See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Reply to Barnett, ProfessorBainbridge.com, May 7, 2004,
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2004/05/reply_to_barnet.html; The Road to Hell Is
Paved with Good Intentions, The Smallest Minority, Mar. 28, 2004,
http://smallestminority.blogspot.com/2004/03/road-to-hell-is-paved-with-good.html; Tung
Yin, Randy Barnett’s Restoring the Lost Constitution, The Yin Blog, Mar. 29, 2004,
http://yin.typepad.com/the_yin_blog/2004/03/randy_barnetts_.html.
See Stephen Macedo, Against the Old Sexual Morality of the New Natural Law, in NATURAL
LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY, supra note 2, at 27, 27.
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Family Research Council and Focus on the Family in Support
of the Respondent at 17-24, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102); Robert P.
George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301, 320
(1995).
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of contraception to unmarried couples.11 There is no essential connection,
however, between natural law reasoning and the specific agenda advocated by
George and Finnis.
But while Barnett vigorously argues against the sort of morals legislation
that George and Finnis have been eager to defend, his libertarian emphasis on
unfettered rights of property and contract is likely to reinforce the notion that
natural law theorizing is an activity best left to those on the rightmost end of
the political spectrum. It would be a mistake, however, to understand Barnett’s
libertarian version of natural law constitutional theory as exhausting—any
more than George and Finnis’s version—the possibilities of the tradition. As I
argue in Part I, although Barnett’s theory of constitutional legitimacy is infused
with language drawn from the broader natural law framework, his “natural
rights” theory, as he calls it, actually departs in significant ways from the
classical natural law tradition. Moreover, there are substantial reasons to favor
a version of natural law with implications for state power that are far more
progressive. Nor does Barnett establish, as I argue in Part II, that the
Constitution itself somehow locks us into a commitment to his libertarian,
natural rights version of natural law theory.
Indeed, without changing much in Barnett’s account, it is possible to
convert his theory from one that supports the conservative goal of limiting the
power of government, restricting it to the narrow task of facilitating or
preserving property and contract rights, into one that justifies a far more
capacious and progressive view. If constitutional legitimacy comes from
conformity with justice, as Barnett correctly argues, and if justice entails not
only negative constraints protecting the individual from certain forms of state
coercion, but also obligations to the community as well as affirmative
entitlements held by individuals and groups against the community, then a
constitution may well be illegitimate if it merely constrains particular state
actions and does not empower, or at times even require, the state to enforce
those obligations and satisfy those entitlements. Nor does support for an
increased state role in the economic sphere commit a progressive natural law
theorist to endorsing state activism in the area of sexual morality. As I argue in
Part III and, indeed, throughout this Review, far from being inherently
conservative (in the contemporary, popular political sense of that term),
natural law constitutional theory is consistent both with respect for a robust
sphere of individual autonomy and with active state regulation and
redistribution of property.

11.

104

See John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 11, 38-39 (1995).
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i. natural law or natural rights? two traditions
Throughout his book, Barnett draws heavily on what might, as a generic
matter, be termed a traditional “natural law” methodology. As a libertarian,
however, Barnett is eager to distance himself from certain aspects of classical
natural law jurisprudence, especially its broadly statist tendencies. He therefore
refers to himself and his Lockean fellow travelers as “natural rights” theorists,
as distinct from “natural law” theorists—a broader category into which he
places Thomas Aquinas.12 “Whereas natural law ethics assesses the propriety of
individual conduct,” Barnett says, “natural rights assesses the propriety or
justice of restrictions imposed on individual conduct.”13 Although I agree with
Barnett that there is something fundamentally different about the projects in
which Locke and Aquinas were engaged, his precise characterization of that
difference is unsatisfying.
To begin with, while it is true that Aquinas explored the rightness or
wrongness of individual actions, he was also, as Barnett recognizes, interested
in questions concerning the proper relationship between the individual and the
state and between morality and law; that is, he was interested in the same
questions of political and legal theory that concern Barnett.14 Of course,
Aquinas’s answers to these questions differ in dramatic ways from those
offered by Locke (and by Barnett). For example, Locke viewed private
ownership as a natural institution preexisting the state, and he regarded the
state’s principal function as safeguarding those private ownership rights.15 In
contrast, Aquinas understood property as socially constructed and subject to a
great deal of communal control and redistribution.16
As Barnett acknowledges, to the extent that Locke and other natural rights
theorists have sought to derive their political theory from their own
observations about human nature, they share certain basic methodological
commitments with those whom Barnett calls “natural law” theorists.17 Aquinas
and Locke (and Barnett) part company, however, when they begin to discuss

12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.

BARNETT, supra note 6, at 82-83.
Id. at 83.
See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 13-14
(1998); see also 1-2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 96, art. 2 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., 1947) (c. 1267-1273).
See JOHN LOCKE, Two Treatises of Government (1690), in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 1, 155 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003).
See 2-2 AQUINAS, supra note 14, q. 66, arts. 2, 7; see also JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL,
POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 188-96 (1998).
See BARNETT, supra note 14, at 13-14.
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the actual contours of a normative theory of human nature. Barnett takes issue
with the frequent characterization of classical liberal political theory as
embracing an “atomistic” conception of the person.18 He correctly observes that
theories of natural rights make no sense outside the context of community
because an individual living apart from all others would have no need for the
protection of individual rights. “[N]atural rights,” he explains, “are those
rights that are needed precisely to protect individuals and associations from the
power of others—including the power of the stronger, of groups, and of the
State—when and only when persons are deeply enmeshed in a social
context.”19
This is surely true. An individual living in total isolation need not worry
about intrusions on his “liberty,” as Barnett understands that term. But
Barnett’s observation also fails to identify accurately the basis for the critique of
classical liberalism at which he is taking aim.20 The communitarian critics to
whom Barnett apparently refers do not allege that classical liberals believe that
people actually do (or even want to) live as isolated individuals. Instead, they
take issue with classical liberal theorists’ derivation of the rules of political
community from a hypothetical state of nature made up of fully formed,
freestanding individuals.21
The classical liberal contractarian argument typically looks something like
the following: it begins with the mature individual in a state of nature
characterized by maximal (negative) liberty and by the utter absence of
involuntary communal commitments or obligations. From this starting point,
classical liberal theorists typically seek to derive rules for society that preserve
as much of this hypothetical state of nature as possible, at least with respect to
the individual’s experience of liberty, while gaining for everyone the benefits of

18.
19.
20.

21.
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See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 83-84.
Id. at 84.
Whether this critique is apt when directed against contemporary liberal theory is a separate
question and, given Barnett’s self-identification with classical liberal legal theory, is not
relevant to my discussion. See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Liberalism and Communitarianism, in 11
THE PHILOSOPHER’S ANNUAL 87, 87-88 (Patrick Grim et al. eds., 1988) (defending “modern
liberalism” against communitarian arguments but distinguishing “classical liberalism” from
the version he defends).
See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 276-77 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005) (1960);
Charles Taylor, Atomism, in POWERS, POSSESSIONS AND FREEDOM 39, 48-49 (Alkis Kontos
ed., 1979). Critics have made a similar argument against John Rawls’s contractarian
arguments. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 62-64 (2d
ed. 1998); Thomas Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in READING RAWLS 1, 9-10 (Norman Daniels ed.,
1989).
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community life. They demand that the move from this hypothetical (and
idealized) situation of isolation and freedom to one of social obligation either
be the result of voluntary choice or, when the constraint is involuntarily
imposed, be justified by the need to preserve (or enhance) every individual’s
enjoyment of the liberty present within the original state of nature.22
Barnett’s underlying political theory perfectly illustrates this move. On the
one hand, he praises voluntary associations and welcomes the substantial
restrictions they often impose on individual liberty, but he does so only to the
extent that they are voluntarily joined. “[U]nder conditions of unanimous
consent,” he argues, “liberty is not inconsistent with both heavy regulation and even
the prohibition of otherwise rightful conduct.”23 Accordingly, like many property
libertarians, he celebrates the restraints on individual freedom assumed by
those who join private residential communities.24 On the other hand, he is
extremely suspicious of the state precisely because he views it as an unchosen
community from which exit is extremely costly:
The larger the land area, the higher the cost of exit and thus the less
meaningful is ‘tacit’ consent to the jurisdiction of the lawmaking
process. Most modern cities are probably too large, but even if they are
small enough, states are certainly too large to command meaningful
unanimous consent.25
Consequently, he favors dramatically limiting the power of virtually all
territorially defined governments to intrude upon individual liberty. Drawing
heavily on Lockean political theory, Barnett argues that the principal purpose
of government must be limited to the protection of a constellation of negative
individual liberties, such as private property and freedom of contract, the

22.

23.
24.

25.

See LOCKE, supra note 15, at 154-57 (describing the transition from the state of nature to
society as a voluntary choice driven by a desire to put the protection of one’s liberty and
property on a more secure footing); Richard A. Epstein, One Step Beyond Nozick’s Minimal
State: The Role of Forced Exchanges in Political Theory, 22 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 286, 289-96
(2005).
BARNETT, supra note 6, at 43.
At the same time, Barnett demonstrates an ambivalence about even such voluntarily joined
communities by emphasizing the importance of the “low cost of exit” from these
communities, a feature that is necessary, he says, to “make[] this initial consent
meaningful.” Id. at 41. He quotes with approval Frank Knight’s statement that “effective
freedom depends upon an alternative open to the non-conforming individual of leaving the
group without suffering loss or damage.” Id.
Id. at 43.
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operation of which helps to preserve the individual liberty present in the
prepolitical state of nature.26
From where does Barnett derive the content of these negative liberties?
From an implicit normative account of the human person as an uncoerced
individual living free from the constraints of involuntary community life. It is
for this reason that Barnett (like other classical liberals) talks about the
appropriate terms on which individuals hypothetically “enter” society with
each other.27 One can only enter society, after all, if one was not already there
to begin with. And, as Charles Taylor has observed, classical liberals
understand this being who enters into society and trades away her preexisting
liberty to be a fully formed, rational, and autonomous individual.28
This normative reliance on the (hypothetically) isolated, autonomous
individual is all that most theorists mean when they accuse Lockean liberals of
constructing their political philosophy upon an atomized conception of human
nature. They are not charging that Lockean liberals actually think that people
prefer to live an antisocial existence or that liberals believe that the state of
nature, as Locke described it, actually existed. Instead, they are charging,
accurately, that classical liberals attribute overriding significance to a
hypothetical individual in isolation, a hypothetical that communitarians find to
be normatively sterile.29 We are a deeply social species, the communitarian
argues, and essentially so.30 Indeed, as Taylor and others have argued, we
cannot even become the mature human beings capable of rational reflection
and free decision (i.e., the sorts of beings presupposed by liberal contractarian
political theory) without substantial, and for the most part involuntary, social
interaction and preparation.31
In other words, the most significant distinction between what Barnett calls
“natural law” and “natural rights” approaches to deciphering the proper
relationship between the individual and the state is not a difference of subject
matter but a radical divergence of normative conceptions of the person. As
John Courtney Murray put it:
The premise of Locke’s state of nature is a denial that sociability is
inherent in the very nature of man, and the assertion that the civil state

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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See id. at 75.
See id. at 68-76.
See Taylor, supra note 21, at 49.
See 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 189-90 (1985).
See MURRAY, supra note 21, at 274, 296.
See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE
VIRTUES 107-09 (2001); Taylor, supra note 21, at 54-57.
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is adventitious, that man is by nature only a solitary atom, who does
not seek in society the necessary condition of his natural perfectibility as
man, but only a utilitarian convenience for the fuller protection of his
individual self in its individuality.32
For communitarians, by contrast, the normative person is the contextualized
individual already embedded in and shaped by the community.33 In light of his
fundamentally different starting point, Aquinas, along with many others
whom Barnett would classify as “natural law” theorists, was not committed to
viewing the state’s principal function as actively preserving an impermeable
membrane of negative liberty that protects the individual from nonconsensual
social obligations.
Contrast the standard Lockean depiction of the state of nature as consisting
of isolated individuals with the story Aquinas told about the status of private
property rights. Rather than beginning with individuals in isolation who then
bargain their way into political community to protect preexisting property
rights, Aquinas began from the point of view of a political community already
in existence. He proceeded to argue that, given the somewhat selfish tendencies
of human beings, communal recognition of limited individual rights of private
ownership was (practically) necessary to encourage industriousness and to
avoid conflict and confusion over who in the community was responsible for
what.34 On one of the few occasions when Aquinas spoke in terms that we
might understand as referring to subjective natural rights, he did so not in
favor of a property owner’s right to be free from communal interference but in
favor of the affirmative entitlement held by a needy individual to share in the
consumption of the community’s material wealth, even when the exercise of
that entitlement involved appropriating the private property of another.35
To summarize, the difference between what Barnett calls “natural law” and
“natural rights” theories is not the subject matter in which they are interested,
as Barnett insists, but rather their substantive conception of the normative
human person. Natural rights theorists, including Locke, build their political
theories on the dubious foundation of a hypothetical, prepolitical individual
bargaining his way into organized political community and holding out for the
best possible deal. Classical natural law theorists begin from a far more realistic
conception of human beings as we have always known them, as animals
already living in society and struggling collectively to find sustainable and just

32.
33.
34.
35.

MURRAY, supra note 21, at 276.
See Taylor, supra note 21, at 60.
See 2a-2ae AQUINAS, supra note 14, q. 66, art. 2.
See id. art. 7.
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mechanisms for balancing the legitimate demands of the community with the
interests and dignity of the individual.
The arguments Barnett provides in this book on behalf of the libertarian
conception of the person, and the basket of negative liberty rights it yields, are
both underdeveloped and unpersuasive. “People living in every society,”
Barnett argues, “confront certain pervasive obstacles to the pursuit of
happiness.”36 Echoing Locke’s arguments about the origins of government,
Barnett identifies the purpose of the political community as rooted in the
human need to overcome what he calls problems of “knowledge, interest, and
power.”37 As within Locke’s political philosophy, people come together to form
a government in order to enhance their ability to protect their preexisting
individual rights without at the same time violating the rights of others. That
is, government is created to permit people to spend less time defending their
own rights against the depredations of others and to avoid the dangers that
arise when people attempt to serve as judge, jury, and executioner in cases that
concern their own interests.38
Even the most cursory consideration of the human condition, however,
reveals the incompleteness of this account. All three of these “problems,” as
Barnett understands them, are challenges faced when individuals attempt to
protect preexisting interests against other individuals or communities. On the
one hand, it is true that this focus is not “antisocial” because these problems
only arise when individuals are actually interacting. On the other hand,
although Barnett intends his theory to be broadly descriptive of pervasive
human experiences, he selectively emphasizes goods and problems associated
with the avoidance of unchosen social interaction and with individual
protection against others—a focus that gives rise to rights understood in the
negative sense as shields. Accordingly, he neglects goods associated with
preparation for, or facilitation and empowerment of, social interaction—a focus
more comfortable with a conception of rights broad enough to encompass both
defense and obligation.
This is not to deny that the problems Barnett identifies are real conflicts
that may well be universal across human communities. But in focusing on
these problems of knowledge, interest, and power, Barnett loses sight of what
we might call problems of survival, preparation, and participation. A shift
toward these neglected problems would push in favor of abandoning Barnett’s
narrowly negative conception of rights for a more capacious view.

36.
37.
38.

110

BARNETT, supra note 6, at 80.
Id.
See LOCKE, supra note 15, at 155.
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For most theorists, it is uncontroversial to posit that human beings are
entitled to access to the resources necessary for physical survival. As even some
of the most libertarian of property scholars have acknowledged, the extreme
needs of some in the community ought to trump the rights that others hold
over their surplus resources.39 Locke himself defended the idea.40
Acknowledging a right to survival resources in effect recognizes the existence of
an entitlement to the (even involuntary) assistance of others under certain
circumstances and, on most accounts, to the assistance of the state in obtaining
survival resources or in fending off attempts by private owners to prevent those
in need from taking them. The very structure of this entitlement, and the
forced sharing it justifies, fits only uncomfortably, if at all, within Barnett’s
discussion of natural rights, in which individual property and contract rights
precede (and limit) the formation of community and pursuit of the common
good.41 An alternative conception views human beings as essentially embedded
in community and understands property rights as the cooperative creations of
the society in the service of human flourishing. On this view, in which the
well-being of the individual and the health of the society (and other individual
members of that society) are indissolubly intertwined, the qualification of
individual property rights in order to protect the lives of individual community
members makes perfect sense.42
In addition to survival, the long period of intellectual and moral training
necessary for full human development means that all human societies confront
the problem of how to ensure the provision and just distribution of scarce

39.
40.
41.

42.

See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM 98-100 (2003).
See LOCKE, supra note 15, at 29-30, 56, 111, 182-83.
Locke’s affirmation of the doctrine of necessity does not demonstrate the compatibility of
that doctrine with libertarian principles as much as it points to the ways in which Locke was
not a pure libertarian. Locke’s embrace of the necessity doctrine derives from his initial
assertion that “God gave the world to Adam and his posterity in common.” Id. at 111. This
communal starting point, itself a remnant of the classical natural law tradition, see 2a-2ae
AQUINAS, supra note 14, q. 66, art. 2, serves as a moderating force within Lockean property
theory—one that does not survive among contemporary libertarians, who tend to reject both
the notion of forced sharing and Locke’s starting point of communal ownership, see, e.g.,
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174, 238 (1974) (“Even to exercise his right to
determine how something he owns is to be used may require other means he must acquire a
right to, for example, food to keep him alive; he must put together, with the cooperation of
others, a feasible package.”); AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS: A NEW CONCEPT OF
EGOISM 54-56 (1964) (arguing that sharing with those in dire need, even in an emergency, is
“an act of generosity, not of moral duty”). This makes some sense because the necessity
doctrine’s prescription of involuntary communal obligation clashes with libertarian
insistence that communal obligation be voluntary.
See 2a-2ae AQUINAS, supra note 14, q. 66, art. 7; FINNIS, supra note 1, at 191-92.

111

PENALVER_12-08-06_POST-OP

the yale law journal

12/8/2006 7:12:18 PM

116:101

2007

resources for training the young, who are in no position to provide for
themselves.43 Again, the pursuit of a social conception of human flourishing
points in the direction of some minimal provision for the well-being and
education of the young, irrespective of the wisdom, diligence, or luck of their
parents. Almost by definition, such an entitlement will demand a degree of
economic redistribution and regulation, either in cash or in kind. Those whose
parents cannot afford education must have that education provided to them at
the expense of others. Moreover, this redistributive educational process
arguably points in the direction of ensuring that the parents of such children
have the economic resources necessary to provide a suitable home environment
in which the educational effort can take root.44 Plausible natural law arguments
can therefore support not just a basic entitlement to education but also such
welfare-state measures as minimum wages, subsidized housing, and social
insurance45—the kinds of redistributive and regulatory economic measures that
Barnett would very much like to rule out.
Finally, resources are necessary to facilitate the sorts of social interactions
essential for a well-lived human life.46 These resources take the form of both
material goods that individuals need to function socially and an underlying
social context in which individuals and groups may interact. With respect to
the former, Adam Smith, Amartya Sen, and others have argued that the precise
content and quantity of the resources necessary for a viable social life will vary
between different societies and within the same society over time.47
Nevertheless, because human beings experience sociability as an imperative
and not as a choice, all societies must struggle with the challenge of providing
adequate opportunities for individuals to obtain the things they need to
function as social beings without at the same time undermining the necessary
incentives for productive activity. In the context of a modern capitalist society

43.
44.

45.
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See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 31, at 107-09.
Recent studies, for example, affirm the importance of families’ financial resources to
children’s educational outcomes. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT
GAP 37-50 (2004) (describing the ways in which family poverty directly hinders the
effectiveness of children’s education); Doris R. Entwisle et al., First Grade and Educational
Attainment by Age 22, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1458, 1481 (2005) (finding that family socioeconomic
status has an enormous impact on children’s ultimate educational attainment).
See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 44, at 129-47.
See Eduardo M. Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming May 2007).
See JOHN A. RYAN, A LIVING WAGE: ITS ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 126-27 (1912);
AMARTYA SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES AND DEVELOPMENT 325-43 (1984); 2 ADAM SMITH, THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 413-506 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1869) (1776).
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like our own, sociability entails meaningful participation in the market, and
this observation in turn suggests a human right to a social safety net that
guarantees a substantial basket of resources. This is not to say that an
entitlement to receive those resources cannot be conditioned on, for example, a
willingness to work if able to do so. But however the details are conceived,
attention to human beings’ social needs pushes strongly toward an entitlement
to substantial and realistic opportunities to obtain the goods required for some
minimally acceptable level of participation in the social life of the community.
An adequate account of the opportunities necessary for the social
participation essential to human flourishing will also consider the background
conditions within which individuals come together to interact. Human beings
live a richer and freer life in a pluralistic social order in which neither the state
nor large private actors can arrogate enough power to monopolize
opportunities for social and economic expression. A progressive natural law
therefore favors a vibrant, organic social and economic life that transpires on a
human scale populated by diverse intermediary communities such as families,
unions, small enterprises, neighborhoods, churches, and many others. It will
also support efforts to responsibly steward the environment for future
generations who are not represented in the political process and whose
interests tend to be discounted by present economic decision-makers.48 The
maintenance of such a rich and humane social and environmental context
requires state action to counterbalance (and redistribute) large concentrations
of private economic power as well as constant vigilance against the possibility
that the state will either overreach or become a tool of powerful private
interests.
The problem these other interests pose for Barnett’s theory of rights is that
their interaction is anything but tidy. Human beings’ material needs, for
example, combine with the vicissitudes of luck and intergenerational effects to
undermine the case for the inflexible and transgenerational protection of
property entitlements that Barnett advocates. If we accept the proposition that
property rights, at least in surplus resources, must give way to the more
pressing needs of nonowners, it follows that a government that takes the side
of property owners who attempt to block such transfers in order to protect
preexisting property entitlements would be acting unjustly. Indeed, given the
scale of modern society and the concomitant opportunities it provides for
owners to shirk their duties to share, government is certainly justified, and
perhaps—given the predictability of that shirking—affirmatively obligated, to

48.

See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting, on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006)
(manuscript at 1-2, on file with author) (discussing the tendency of cost-benefit analysis to
undervalue the interests of future generations). TK Month
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compel the wealthy to share their surplus with the poor.49 The natural law
arguments on behalf of such involuntary redistribution are especially
compelling when applied to the resource needs of the young, whose poverty
cannot be attributed to poor choices of their own. But they also point toward
the importance of protecting the poorest—young and old—against the effects
of sheer bad luck. And the failure of any capitalist economy to provide
employment opportunities at a living wage for all who are willing to work or to
provide fully for the needs of the poor through voluntary philanthropy means
that the implications of the analysis likely extend even further.
Support for state intervention in the economy, however, does not require a
progressive theory of natural law to endorse the sorts of intrusions on private
sexual conduct advocated by Finnis, George, and other conservative natural
lawyers. As Barnett helpfully highlights, even the classical natural law
tradition, despite its perfectionist ambitions, provides ample tools to resist the
state’s insertion into every corner of life, including private consensual sexual
relationships. Barnett quotes, for example, Aquinas’s famous argument about
the folly of trying to legally enforce all moral norms.50 According to Aquinas:
[H]uman law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of
whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid
all vices, from which the virtuous abstain but only the more grievous
vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly
those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human
society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft
and suchlike.51
As Aquinas pointed out, attempts to embody all of morality in law are doomed
to failure and are likely to be counterproductive, inducing in citizens a
contempt for law and perhaps even an embrace of a sort of moral and legal
nihilism.52 The tools of legal prohibition should therefore be reserved for the
kinds of harmful conduct that are likely to substantially disrupt the social
order.

49.

50.
51.
52.
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See JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS, 1981-1991, at 240-44 (1993); cf.
Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property 19 (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No.
06-30, 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=926082 (discussing the collective
action problems that push philanthropic impulses toward arguments for forced
redistribution).
BARNETT, supra note 6, at 83.
1a-2ae AQUINAS, supra note 14, q. 96, art. 2 (emphasis added).
See id.
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As a general matter, these considerations apply with equal force to state
efforts to enforce the (moral) demands of distributive justice. How far the state
should go in attempting to enforce moral obligations to shift material resources
toward the poor will be a complicated prudential calculation, deeply informed
by empirical considerations.53 Given this uncertainty and contingency, it is
easier to draw negative than affirmative conclusions. For example, it is easier to
rule out Barnett’s rigidly libertarian constitution, which would categorically
prohibit the state from interfering with the operation of the market,
irrespective of empirical observations about the likely consequences of such
intervention for the poor, than it is to spell out in precise detail the exact
contours of economic entitlements or the most just system of taxation with
which to fund them. Nevertheless, the correct questions are prudential, not
questions about the rights of property owners against redistribution of their
surplus property. A progressive natural lawyer, moreover, would argue that the
state is justified in treating the enforcement of economic justice differently than
questions of sexual morality (however defined) because of the relative difficulty
of detecting and deterring violations of sexual norms, the harm to privacy of
even attempting to do so, and the fundamental importance of distributive
justice to the maintenance over the long run of a viable social order.
In the middle of the last century, for example, Murray built upon Aquinas’s
pragmatic discussion to argue against the legal prohibition of private sexual
acts, such as the use of contraception.54 Writing in terms that even a libertarian
like Barnett might well endorse, Murray argued that respect for the important
role of freedom within an adequate account of human flourishing meant that
the law should be guided by the principle, “[a]s much freedom as possible; as
much restriction and coercion as necessary.”55 Murray went on to note that, “in

53.

54.

55.

See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL
LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY ¶ 20 (1986). The complex
empirical inquiries relevant to the formulation of redistributive policy include, among many
others, what resources the poor need at particular times and places to flourish, the best form
in which to deliver those resources (e.g., in cash or in kind, as a grant or in exchange for
required work), the effects of different degrees of economic inequality on the well-being of
the poor and on society as a whole, and the consequences of redistributive policy for
society’s overall productivity and for the poor themselves.
See John Courtney Murray, Memo to Cardinal Cushing on Contraception Legislation,
http://woodstock.georgetown.edu/library/Murray/1965F.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2006).
Finnis has indicated that he accepts reasoning along Murray’s line of argument, although he
rejects its extension to the case of public distribution of contraception to unmarried couples.
See Finnis, supra note 11, at 38-39. Although Murray specifically declined to address the
broader question about contraception, it is not clear from Murray’s fairly sweeping analysis
in the Cushing Memo that he would have accepted Finnis’s distinction.
Murray, supra note 54.
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the field of sex morality” in particular, “the public educative value of law seems
almost nil.”56 Finally, he observed that the lack of public consensus on the
immorality of contraception put it beyond the proper reach of legal
prohibition.57 Others operating within the natural law tradition have used
similar logic to defend the result the Court reached in Lawrence v. Texas.58
Although a full evaluation of the various arguments raised on behalf of these
positions is well beyond the scope of this Review, at a minimum these
examples suggest that there is no essential connection between natural law
theory and a commitment to the state’s involvement in the enforcement of
sexual morality, or even to a particularly conservative conception of sexual
morality.59
Drawing the appropriate limits around permissible state action in the
private sphere ultimately depends upon the consideration of a complex calculus
regarding the effectiveness of legal norms in particular contexts as well as the
development of an adequate account of human flourishing and the role of
human freedom within that account. Barnett’s narrowly negative conception of
the state’s proper role results from his failure to consider the dependence of
human freedom on the social structures necessary to prepare human beings to
exercise their freedom and on the material resources they need to affirmatively
put that freedom into practice. Rejecting libertarian limits on state intervention
in the economic sphere, however, does not require the progressive natural
lawyer to jettison Barnett’s correct intuition that freedom from excessive
government intrusion is an important component of human flourishing.
In drawing attention to the absence from Barnett’s book of an extended
exploration and defense of the content of his natural rights theory, I do not
intend to criticize him. After all, Barnett structures his argument precisely to
avoid having to engage in protracted philosophical debate regarding the
content of natural law. In the end, however, as I will argue in the next Part, I
believe that he cannot get around the arduous job of fleshing out the

56.
57.
58.

59.
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Id.
Id.
538 U.S. 558 (2003); see Gregory A. Kalscheur, Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons for
U.S. Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 1 (2006). Some prominent theorists have gone even further and have used natural law
arguments to defend the substantive morality of homosexuality. See infra note 59.
See, e.g., HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 214-15 (defending the morality of homosexuality on
natural law grounds); Macedo, supra note 9, at 28 (“[T]he new natural law’s own moral
stance, properly understood, provides grounds for affirming the good of sexual
relationships between committed, loving homosexual partners . . . .”); Jean Porter, Human
Nature and the Purposes of Marriage (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(arguing in natural law terms for the permissibility of gay marriage).
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philosophical bases for his libertarian political commitments. My only purpose
in these past few paragraphs has been to suggest that, when he does set out to
do so, he must confront these alternative conceptions of the natural law
tradition.
ii. barnett’s nonoriginalist originalism
A. Barnett’s Argument
Barnett attempts to rule out alternative versions of the natural law he
believes to have been incorporated into the Constitution. As I have already
indicated, however, he does not do so by setting forth extensive arguments on
behalf of his particular conception of the content and nature of natural rights.
Instead, he devotes a great deal of his book to an innovative nonoriginalist
argument in favor of a rigidly originalist understanding of the Constitution’s
text.
As Trevor Morrison has noted, Barnett’s commitment to original meaning
is itself something of a paradox.60 This is because originalism makes far more
sense within a consent theory of constitutional legitimacy than within a theory,
like Barnett’s, that purports to base constitutional legitimacy on natural justice
alone.61 If a constitution only binds because “We the People” have collectively
consented to its strictures, a backward-looking orientation that seeks to
preserve the original terms of that bargain above all else makes a great deal of
sense. The problem is that Barnett claims to reject these historical, consentgrounded theories of constitutional legitimacy in favor of a natural law, justicebased account.62 Barnett’s rejection of consent seems to undermine his case for
hewing to an originalist interpretive methodology. After all, if, instead of
trying to figure out the terms of the “deal” to which the People have agreed, we
concern ourselves with the objective justice of an existing constitutional
regime, then the deviation of that regime from the original meaning of a

60.
61.

62.

See Trevor W. Morrison, Lamenting Lochner’s Loss: Randy Barnett’s Case for a Libertarian
Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 849 (2005) (reviewing BARNETT, supra note 6).
See id. at 848-49; see also Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997) (“The political theory
underlying strict originalism is a form of social contract theory . . . .”). After noting the
connection commonly drawn between originalist and contractarian theories of
constitutional legitimacy, Dorf suggests that this link can be severed and goes on to propose
a noncontractarian case for the (limited) relevance of original intent. See Dorf, supra, at
1816-22.
See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 32-52.
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historical document is not really very troubling (except to the degree that it
increases the risk that the constitutional system will transform itself from one
that is just to one that is unjust at some time in the future—an issue to which I
will return shortly).
Despite the strangeness of his combination of a justice-based theory of
legitimacy with originalism, Barnett’s arguments in favor of a fairly strict
originalist hermeneutic are the foundation of his entire constructive project.
Eschewing a direct defense of the cogency of his political theory against
alternatives, Barnett’s strategy is to avoid getting mired in deep philosophical
argument by compelling his readers to accept that the Constitution itself
incorporates the limitations on state action favored by his libertarian reading of
Lockean political theory and that the Constitution itself rejects the obligations
imposed by other theories of justice, such as the progressive version of natural
law theory sketched out above.63 To paraphrase Barnett’s argument, his
version of natural rights theory might be right or it might be wrong, but that
theory is embodied in the original meaning of the Constitution. And because
the original meaning is the only meaning that counts, if you want the
Constitution to embody some other political theory, you will have to get your
own constitution or amend the existing one. In other words, Barnett’s
argument for original-meaning textualism (along with the evidence he
marshals in support of the original meaning he favors), if successful, allows
him to enjoy all the fruits of a libertarian constitution while sidestepping the
far more daunting task of laying out a full-fledged argument for the
philosophical superiority of his theory.64
Barnett’s argument for (Lockean) original-meaning textualism proceeds in
three steps. First, he posits that, as a conceptual matter, the principal purpose
of a written constitution is to constrain government actors who might
otherwise be free to act in ways that trample on individual rights: “The

63.
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Some scholars have identified less individualistic principles at work in Lockean political
theory, particularly as it touches on property rights. See, e.g., ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND
WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD 204-05 (2003) (describing Lockean
property theory as consistent with stringent restraints on the intensive use of property);
GOPAL SREENIVASAN, THE LIMITS OF LOCKEAN RIGHTS IN PROPERTY (1995) (arguing that
Locke’s theory results in highly limited property rights). Whether these theorists or Barnett
read Locke more accurately is an interesting question but is beyond the scope of this
Review.
Barnett’s negative argument against the viability of consent as a basis for constitutional
legitimacy does not rest on a fully developed argument for libertarianism but rather on a
more truncated argument, the goal of which is simply to establish that “first come rights,
and then comes law.” BARNETT, supra note 6, at 44. As he is careful to point out, “One need
not accept any particular formulation of background rights . . . to accept the conception of
constitutional legitimacy advanced here.” Id.

PENALVER_12-08-06_POST-OP

12/8/2006 7:12:18 PM

restoring the right constitution?

Constitution is a law designed to restrict the lawmakers. Although the
Constitution itself may have multiple purposes and functions, its ‘writtenness’
has many fewer. . . . Primarily, constitutions are put in writing to better
constrain the political actors [they] empower[] to accomplish various ends.”65
To be clear, Barnett cannot merely be making a historical claim about the
reasons why the Framers committed our particular Constitution to writing,
and he cannot be arguing that we are somehow bound by their motives. Given
his rejection of consent and other historical accounts of constitutional
legitimacy, those motives are not relevant to his case for originalism. Instead,
Barnett is making a sweeping conceptual claim that writtenness in
constitutions serves the purpose of constraining government power.
He then goes on to claim that the only way for a written constitution to
achieve, and then “lock in,” this constraint is to limit the text’s meaning to its
meaning at the time it was put in place: “Adopting any meaning contrary to the
original meaning would be to contradict or change the meaning of the text and
thereby to undermine the value of writtenness itself. Writtenness ceases to
perform its function if meaning can be changed in the absence of an equally
written modification or amendment.”66 In other words, Barnett believes that a
commitment to original-meaning textualism follows “inexorably” from the
mere fact that the Constitution is a written document.67 Barnett goes on to
argue that it is the constitution thus locked into place by original meaning, and
only that constitution, that we should evaluate from the point of view of our
preferred theory of justice. If, based on one’s conception of justice, the
constitution locked in by this written document is inadequate, then the answer
is not to reinterpret the text in a manner consistent with that conception but
rather to amend the text.68
Finally, Barnett argues, the original meaning of our particular written
Constitution locks in classical liberal views about the proper limits of
government power and the sphere of negative liberty protecting the individual
from communal coercion. Barnett points to provisions like the Necessary and
Proper Clause, the Ninth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges or Immunities Clause, as well as to a host of contemporaneous
commentary, in support of this proposition. The combined effect of these
provisions, he argues, is to limit both state and federal governments to

65.
66.
67.
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Id. at 103.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 112.
See id. at 111-12.
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activities that do not violate the natural rights retained by the people.69 Barnett
therefore argues for what he calls a “presumption of liberty,” an inversion of
the prevailing, post-Lochner presumption in favor of the constitutionality of
most legislative enactments. By a “presumption of liberty,” Barnett means that
parties burdened by intrusions on (negative) liberty—whether at the hands of
state or federal government—are presumptively entitled to judicial invalidation
of those intrusions unless the government can demonstrate that its actions are
(strictly) necessary to the accomplishment of (a very narrow conception of)
permissible government ends.70
Barnett’s strategy, if successful, would allow him to enjoy all the fruits of
his libertarian version of natural law theory without ever having to offer, in any
detail, his reasons for favoring it over competing possibilities. As it turns out,
Barnett’s argument in favor of original-meaning textualism and an exclusively
Lockean originalist reading of the Constitution is far from watertight. Indeed,
it raises serious questions at each step. To begin with, there does not seem to
be an intrinsic connection between writtenness and the goal of constraining
government intrusion on individual liberty. And even if there were such a
connection, original-meaning textualism would not be the only means
available to accomplish that goal. Finally, even if one were to accept originalmeaning textualism, along with Barnett’s understanding of the Constitution’s
original meaning, there would be ample room for a government that is
substantially more activist than the one Barnett favors.
B. Writtenness and Constraint
Barnett’s argument that the purpose of writtenness in constitutions is to
constrain lawmakers could be taken to mean either of two things, one of which
is facially implausible and the other of which appears to beg the question. If we
understand Barnett to be saying that a constitution’s writtenness necessarily
serves the purpose of constraining government actors in the sense of limiting
their discretion, the argument crashes headlong into what my colleague Abner
Greene has called the “grand, vague clauses of the Constitution.”71 Writings,
whether contractual or constitutional, can constrain discretion, or they can
invite it. Our written Constitution, like many others, appears to do both.72
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See id. at 54, 189-90, 193-94.
See id. at 253-69.
Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1936 (2006).
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”),
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Barnett cannot simply write off the Constitution’s many opaque provisions
as atypical or peripheral to his libertarian project. After all, the Constitution is
at its vaguest when it sets forth the terms on which government may deprive
citizens of life, liberty, and property; when it specifies (or fails to specify) the
privileges and immunities to which citizens are entitled; and when it
safeguards the equal protection of the laws. And these are the very clauses on
which Barnett wishes to hang a great deal of his constitutional theory.
If, as seems more likely, we understand Barnett to be saying that the
purpose of writtenness is to constrain government actors in the sense of
limiting their power (that is, checking and restraining state actors),73 then
Barnett seems to smuggle into his premises the libertarian conclusion he
wishes to establish. From the point of view of a political theory that rejects
libertarian conclusions and recognizes fundamental and affirmative material
entitlements against the community, the goal of a constitution, even of the
writtenness of a constitution, would not be simply to constrain state actors.
Consider, for example, a conception of justice, like the progressive version of
natural law theory introduced above, that understands the individual as
affirmatively entitled to a basic education and level of material well-being,
whatever his luck or the life choices or material circumstances of his parents.
On such a view, a state that could only protect the prerogatives of private
ownership but that was not empowered, or perhaps obligated, to tax its
citizens in order to fund a redistributive system of public education (or private
educational vouchers) would fall short of the demands of justice and would
therefore, on Barnett’s view of legitimacy, be invalid. By characterizing the
purpose of the Constitution’s writtenness as primarily about the constraint (by
which he seems to mean limitation) of government power rather than about its
compulsion, Barnett appears simply to be helping himself to the libertarian
view of government as, above all, a threat to be restrained.74

73.
74.

with id. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .”). In this respect, the U.S. Constitution seems typical of written
constitutions, which often contain a mixture of vague principles and specific directives.
Compare ALA. CONST. § 15 (“[E]xcessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishment inflicted.”), with id. amend. 480 (“Effective the beginning of the next term of
office after ratification of this amendment, the judge of probate of Greene county shall be
compensated on a salary basis.”). For a discussion of discretion-inviting constitutional
provisions in the South African context, see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE
OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 149-63
(2006).
BARNETT, supra note 6, at 105.
Barnett also fails to take notice of the special circumstances posed for a natural rights
libertarian theory by large corporations. These massive and powerful entities, themselves
artificial creations of the state, possess none of the natural traits that would entitle them to
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Sotirios Barber has correctly noted that one need not even reject a
fundamentally libertarian conception of the state to understand that the
purpose of a constitution must be both to constrain and to empower.75 After
all, government will not act as an effective nightwatchman if it does not have
the power and obligation to tax and spend. As Alexander Hamilton put it,
“[T]he vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty . . . [and] a
dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the
rights of the people than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the
firmness and efficiency of government.”76 Acknowledging as much, Barnett
notes that his conception of liberty will sometimes require government to take
affirmative steps to satisfy its rights-protecting obligations.77 But this
admission does not keep him from often writing as if the “security of liberty”
has an asymmetric relationship with government empowerment and
constraint, to the disadvantage of the former.78
In light of the state’s affirmative role in protecting even narrowly negative
conceptions of liberty, however, it is far from self-evident that the
Constitution’s writtenness uniquely serves the purpose of constraining
government power such that it does not also serve the purpose of empowering
(or obligating) government to act to protect citizens’ rights. One move in
Barnett’s direction would be to assert, as Barnett does, that state actors are in
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the same regard as actual persons within a natural law political theory, even a libertarian
one. See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR
BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 18-21 (1986). To be sure, there are reasons to protect the rights of
large corporations, most having to do with instrumental goals of wealth creation or the
indirect protection of the natural rights of their members or owners. But those rights will be
of a different sort than the natural rights grounded in human nature that are of concern to
Barnett, and there is no reason to assume that their content will be precisely the same. See id.
at 88-96. Barnett largely ignores these complications and appears to endorse simply
extending to corporations the same “natural” liberty rights enjoyed by real human beings.
See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 6, at 265 (discussing the liberty interests of companies that
wish to carry first-class mail). There is nothing inevitable about that treatment, as Gregory
Alexander makes clear in his discussion of German constitutional law. See ALEXANDER, supra
note 72, at 103. A recognition of the dubious natural grounds for corporate rights would
open up a far broader role for state regulation to protect the autonomy interests of actual
persons against corporate giants.
See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION 44-53 (2003) (arguing that the
pursuit and protection of so-called negative liberties demand government power).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 84.
See id. at 103 (“The Constitution is a law designed to restrict the lawmakers.”); id. at 104
(“Unless rulers are constrained by law, they are dangerous to the not-at-all-fictional rights
of the people.”); id. at 104-05 (“How can . . . governors [be] checked and restrained if the
written words mean only what legislatures or judges want them to mean today?”).
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fact inexorably prone to overstep their bounds in a way that renders
writtenness’s constraining function more fundamental than its empowering
function.79
The “Ambitious Official,” a well known trope, has been around since the
beginning of American constitutional discourse.80 And the Constitution’s
writtenness may well help to keep his ambitions in check, although, as I discuss
below, perhaps not as much as Barnett seems to think. But another, less
prominent trope demonstrates why, at least as a conceptual matter, writtenness
can be just as crucial to the empowerment of government actors as to their
limitation. I am thinking here of the “Lazy Bureaucrat.” The Lazy Bureaucrat is
as incompetent and shiftless as his overbearing cousin is savvy and ambitious.
In response to a citizen’s entreaty, the Lazy Bureaucrat is prone to wearily wave
off the request by disclaiming the authority or obligation to act. For the Lazy
Bureaucrat, government office is about short hours, steady paychecks, the
accoutrements of power, and perhaps the occasional kickback.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA)—under the direction of Michael Brown, who
may forever be identified as the paradigmatic Lazy Bureaucrat—explained the
federal government’s slow response to the disaster by saying that it did not
have the authority to provide assistance until specifically invited to do so by
state officials.81 FEMA was very likely understating its authority, thereby
attempting to minimize its responsibility to act in the early hours of the crisis.82
Efforts by the Lazy Bureaucrats of the world to shirk their duties serve as
important counterpoints to the assumption that government actors will
relentlessly and ambitiously push toward the outer limits of their power.
Just as a written constitution can be said to serve the purpose of clarifying
the limits on the Ambitious Official’s powers, so too it provides needed
ammunition for those attempting to convince the Lazy Bureaucrat that he has
the discretion—or even the obligation—to act. In other words, the writtenness
of a constitution can, as a conceptual matter, serve multiple functions at once:
it can clarify the limits it imposes on government actors, and it can make plain
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See id. at 104.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (discussing the system of checks and
balances and explaining how setting bureaucratic ambitions against each other can protect
against government abuse of power).
See World News Tonight: Who’s To Blame for Delayed Response to Katrina? (ABC television
broadcast Sept. 6, 2005), available at http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/print?id=1102467.
See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAW & NAT’L SEC. ET AL., HURRICANE KATRINA TASK FORCE
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 4-5 (2006), http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/publications/
hurricane_katrina_report_2006_2.pdf.
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the powers and duties it grants to them. It may well be that, as classical liberals
suppose, the task of constraining the Ambitious Official is a more pressing (or
more frequent) problem than motivating the Lazy Bureaucrat,83 but the truth
of this empirical assertion cannot be deduced (as Barnett attempts to do) from
the mere fact that the Constitution is a written document.
Moreover, it is not even clear that a belief in the greater threat posed by the
Ambitious Official would mean that written constitutions must be understood
to constrain the power of the actors toward whom they are directed. Another
strategy, one apparently favored by the Framers, would be to empower
competing bodies of government in the hope that they would limit each
other.84 Confronted with an expansionist executive branch, a weak and
quiescent legislative or judicial branch arguably only further endangers liberty.
Indeed, Barnett’s solution to the problem of the “lost Constitution,” in which
he calls for a radical empowerment of one branch of the federal government—the
federal judiciary—through his presumption of liberty, implicitly relies on a
similar intuition.
In the final analysis, Barnett’s argument that the Constitution’s writtenness
uniquely serves the purpose of governmental constraint appears to be simply a
restatement of his classical liberal commitments.85 Perhaps these commitments
will turn out to be the correct ones, but Barnett must make that argument.
C. Constraint and Lock-In
Even assuming that the principal purpose of a written constitution is to
constrain, it is far from self-evident that, as Barnett claims, the only adequate
way to honor the significance of that purpose is through a commitment to the
original meaning of constitutional texts. To understand Barnett’s argument for
the exclusive suitability of original meaning, it is important to distinguish
between two different, although related, concepts at play in Barnett’s
argument: constraint and “lock-in.” Barnett argues that the purpose of the
Constitution’s writtenness is to constrain government actors—that is, to limit
the government’s present freedom of action or power. That constraint,
however, is fairly meaningless, he suggests, if it is not accompanied by what he
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As Barber argues, it is not clear that this was the view of the Framers. See BARBER, supra note
75, at 39, 53.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 76, at 322 (“Ambition must be
made to counteract ambition.”).
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divergent treatment to the power-conferring and power-limiting provisions of the
Constitution’s text. See Calabresi, supra note 7, at 1083-88.

PENALVER_12-08-06_POST-OP

12/8/2006 7:12:18 PM

restoring the right constitution?

calls “lock-in”: the successful projection of that constraint into the future.
Barnett’s concern for lock-in as an independent goal of constitutional
writtenness can itself be understood as combining, on the one hand, concerns
about predictability and stability in constitutional interpretation, and, on the
other, a more substantive, justice-based demand for stability in the way a
constitutional system actually operates. Barnett’s discussion does not always
distinguish clearly among these various interests, but his objection to
nonoriginalist hermeneutics of the constitutional text appears to be twofold:
first, they do not adequately constrain constitutional interpretation, and
second, they provide an inadequate guarantee that the constraints on
government imposed today by the application of an interpretive method will
not be modified (say, by judicial reinterpretation of the constitutional text)
tomorrow. The latter failure is both unfaithful to the Constitution’s
writtenness and, Barnett suggests, can be substantively unjust.
1. Constraint
To begin with, as many theorists have noted, it is important not to
overstate how much actual constraint original-meaning textualism provides,
particularly when we consider the difficulty of determining the proper level of
generality at which to assess competing original meanings.86 Setting aside
originalism’s practical difficulties, let us assume that Barnett is correct that the
highest degree of interpretive constraint comes from adherence to a written
text’s objective original meaning. Interpretive anarchy, however, is not the only
alternative to such a commitment. Barnett treats the constraint he advocates as
if it were an all-or-nothing affair,87 but the interpretive constraint of
writtenness is a question of degrees.
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See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 119-22; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999
Term—Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 53 (2000) (“To
interpret the document . . . is to engage in an act of construction . . . .”); Martin S. Flaherty,
The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1812-13 (1996) (describing various originalist
approaches to constitutional interpretation that vary in the generality of the principles they
attribute to the Constitution’s original meaning); Michael J. Gerhardt, The End of Theory, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 283, 325 (2001) (reviewing JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY
OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001)) (“The challenge of originalism entails
eliminating subjective discretion in choosing the level of generality at which to state the
appropriate level of original understanding.”); Morrison, supra note 60, at 854-55
(discussing the problem of generality); Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 312-13 (1996) (contrasting “soft” and “hard” originalism).
See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 106.

125

PENALVER_12-08-06_POST-OP

the yale law journal

12/8/2006 7:12:18 PM

116:101

2007

At least as a conceptual matter, between original-meaning textualism and
utter disregard of a written text, there are a number of intermediate positions
that, while perhaps less constraining than the most optimistic descriptions of
original-meaning textualism, still take seriously the Constitution’s writtenness.
Alternative hermeneutics, of either the soft originalist or nonoriginalist variety,
might direct lawyers to look to the present consensus meaning of the text,88 the
relevant paradigm cases implicated by a particular textual provision,89 the best
“translation” of what they take to be the motivating general principle behind
the text,90 or their understanding of the requirements of legal “integrity” as
they operate on understandings of that particular text.91 A judge faithfully
applying one of these interpretive methods might be able to make the
Constitution mean many things, but she could not make it mean anything she
wanted. Texts are not infinitely pliable, particularly when read according to an
established interpretive practice.92 An overriding desire to honor the
Constitution’s writtenness, understood as a constraint on interpretation, does
not by itself necessitate an exclusive commitment to original-meaning
textualism.
At most, Barnett has established that his favored interpretive method is one
possibility among many or, perhaps, that it provides the greatest interpretive
constraint among the various contenders. What Barnett needs is some
argument that lesser forms of constraint are somehow inadequate and that only
the highest possible degree of constraint will do justice to the function of a
document’s writtenness—but he provides us with none.
2. Lock-In
As with constraint, lock-in is a matter of degree. If a particular
nonoriginalist reading of the constitutional text can provide enough
interpretive constraint to do justice to the Constitution’s writtenness, an
independent concern for stability, understood as future interpretive
predictability, would not seem to change the equation. If an interpretive
method provides sufficient constraint for interpreters today, at least as a matter
of constitutional writtenness, it is not clear why the degree of future lock-in it
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provides would be inadequate. Indeed, as Thomas Merrill has argued, a
nonoriginalist interpretive method accompanied by a strong theory of stare
decisis might well provide more interpretive predictability than an originalist
method in which newly discovered or indeterminate historical evidence
concerning original meaning creates the possibility of a constant reassessment
of even longstanding constitutional readings.93
Of course, under almost any political theory, the substantive question of
justice is not wholly separate from inquiries about constitutional stability.
Barnett is therefore certainly correct when he suggests that some degree of
actual stability in the operation of constitutional structures is necessary for a
constitutional system to be worthy of obedience.94 But he never specifies
precisely how much stability justice requires, nor does he make the case that
the requisite stability can only be provided by adherence to the original
meaning of our written Constitution.
The closest Barnett comes to an argument in this regard is his suggestion
that a sufficiently stable system of liberty would be impossible to maintain in
the absence of a written constitution and that, as a consequence, an unwritten
constitutional system—or a written constitutional system not constrained by
originalist interpretation—would be substantively unjust.95 Barnett would be
hard-pressed, however, to demonstrate that a seemingly stable system that
operates justly in all other respects is ultimately unjust and is therefore
unworthy of obedience simply because it does not hew closely to the original
meaning of a unitary constitutional document. But this is exactly what he
needs to establish in order to sustain his argument that only original-meaning
textualism is consistent with constitutional legitimacy (understood as
substantive justice). Without such a premise, Barnett cannot, given his strictly
justice-based theory of constitutional legitimacy, rule out the legitimacy of a
nonoriginalist judicial reinterpretation of a constitutional text, as long as that
reinterpretation coheres with the substantive demands of justice. Barnett’s
answer is (as it must be) to deny that a constitution not reduced to writing
could satisfy the requirements of justice. This assertion, however, depends
upon extremely controversial empirical assumptions that go completely
unsupported in his book.96
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See id. at 516.
See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 109, 117 (noting an essential connection between
constitutional legitimacy—that is, justice—and constitutional writtenness).
See id.
Larry Kramer’s description of the stability of the customary English Constitution seems to
belie Barnett’s prediction of the uncertainty and oppression that would result from a failure
to memorialize constitutional constraints in a written document. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
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Nor is it even clear that a written constitution interpreted according to its
original meaning is sufficient to provide the actual stability that justice
demands. For example, the original meaning of a written constitution might
make the amendment process exceedingly easy.97 Even for a constitution with
onerous amendment provisions, however, it is not the words themselves, or
their original meaning, that ensures that today’s constraints on government
action will survive tomorrow. It is only the words in conjunction with an
institutionalized commitment to recognizing the authority of those words or
that meaning.98 After all, there is no more assurance that the commitment to
the original meaning of the writing will survive than there is a guarantee that
an otherwise perfectly just, although unwritten, constitutional system will
continue to operate justly in the future. Barnett’s story about a “lost
Constitution” is precisely one in which he argues that a commitment to
original meaning has been missing in this country for the greater part of a
century.
If it is the case that constitutional stability owes more to a (nontextual)
commitment of government actors to be constrained by particular meanings
than to the words of the Constitution itself, it would seem that as much (or as
little) actual stabilizing work could be done even with a commitment to
nonoriginalist readings of the constitutional text. We can imagine, for example,
that there might be an entrenched customary commitment not to change the
nonoriginalist principles on which the government operates absent some
formalized, supermajoritarian—but perhaps unwritten—“amendment” process
that gauges public sentiment to permit such a fundamental change. Bruce
Ackerman’s dualist constitutional theory could be described as setting forth
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PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 12-15 (2004). The
government system produced by this unwritten constitution does not seem to have been so
unstable as to become, for that reason alone, unjust. Even if Kramer has painted an overly
rosy view of the English Constitution’s clarity and stability, see, e.g., J.W. GOUGH,
FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 2 (1955); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 49 (reissue 1987) (1957), we can fairly easily imagine a
society that operates along the lines Kramer describes. Barnett must do more to convince
readers that not only a written constitution but, indeed, one interpreted according to its
original meaning, is necessary to achieve the degree of stability actually required by natural
justice.
The current Alabama Constitution (the state’s sixth), for example, allows amendment by
legislative proposal, a process that requires a three-fifths vote in both houses of the Alabama
legislature. ALA. CONST. § 284. Amendments so proposed are then submitted for approval
by a majority of voters. Id. Perhaps unsurprisingly, in light of the ease with which it can be
altered, the Alabama Constitution has been amended nearly 800 times since its adoption in
1901.
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56-57 (2d ed. 1994).
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such a “cultural” model of constitutional stability.99 Would such a
constitutional culture necessarily yield substantively inadequate lock-in,
understood as actual stability? Barnett rejects Ackerman’s theory as providing
inadequate stability compared to textual originalism,100 but he does not set
forth any good reasons for doing so. Although Ackerman’s theory provides a
slightly easier method of constitutional amendment, both theories would
appear to provide stability to a degree that is at least sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of justice. Their most salient difference seems to be the precise
legal content they identify for perpetuation.
In summary, the Constitution’s writtenness, even if understood as
performing a constraining or stabilizing function, does not, by itself, compel us
to accept original-meaning textualism as the only possible interpretive method.
Barnett cannot rule out alternative hermeneutics without making substantive
arguments in favor of the libertarian commitments plainly underlying his
interpretive preferences.
D. The Nature of Natural Rights
Even if one were convinced by Barnett’s argument that original-meaning
textualism is the only way to lock in a just constitutional scheme, Barnett’s
plausible reading of the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and the Ninth Amendment as incorporating elements of natural law
into the constitutional scheme is not properly limited to the libertarian
conception of the content of natural law at the expense of more progressive
versions of natural law theory. Barnett’s natural rights theory and its
progressive natural law rival agree in their views of human rights and
obligations, whatever their content, as in some sense objectively grounded.101
As Barnett says, in language that many adherents to a progressive natural law
methodology could easily accept, “[T]he existence of individual rights is an
appropriate conclusion from the nature of human beings and the world in
which we live.”102
Given such a conception of the status of human rights, it is possible, in fact
practically necessary, to take Barnett’s originalist reading of the Ninth
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause as gesturing toward
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See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266-94 (1991).
See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 108-09.
See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS: A HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY
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BARNETT, supra note 6, at 44.
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objective moral categories—rights and obligations grounded in human
nature—that serve as constraints on (or imperatives for) government action.
Even if the Framers happened to understand the precise content of those
natural rights in specifically libertarian terms, Barnett does not offer a reason
why we must understand the referent of the constitutional provisions on which
he focuses to be Locke’s conception of the content of those rights and not the
actual natural rights themselves, whatever they might be.103 Indeed, Barnett’s
claim of a consensus at the time of the Framing regarding the content of
natural rights may actually undermine the result he seeks, because it renders
fundamentally ambiguous any reference to natural rights in the Framers’
reflections on the Constitution’s meaning. Without any controversy over the
issue, there was no need for the Framers to clarify whether they understood the
Constitution to reflect the rights actually retained by the people or only the
Lockean understanding of those rights.
Originalist considerations would also seem to favor an interpretation not
limited by libertarian presuppositions. The Ninth Amendment refers to the
“rights . . . retained by the people.”104 It is far more straightforward to
understand this language as referring to the “rights . . . [actually] retained by
the people,” whatever those might be, than to treat the text as somehow selfreferentially limiting its significance to the Framers’ specific understanding of
the content of those rights. The Framers were not proto-pragmatists or
postmodernists, in the mold of a Richard Rorty or a Stanley Fish, intent only
on articulating and preserving what they understood to be a particular (and
parochial) tradition of Western liberal discourse. As Barnett notes, the Framers
(and indeed, most everyone in their generation) really believed in something
called “natural rights” and thought it impossible to reduce the rights with
which they were concerned to some finite list that could, as such, be
incorporated by reference into the constitutional scheme.105 Indeed, he argues,
it was just this impossibility that led the Framers to include the Ninth
Amendment in the Bill of Rights in the first place.106
In other words, a natural law view that identifies the referents of the Ninth
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause as those rights grounded
in human nature, and not one contingent (and contested) theory of those
rights, could, without changing any other aspect of Barnett’s theory, open the
door to the constitutional assertion of a progressive natural law theory. As our
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best working theories about human flourishing and, consequently, about the
content of human rights developed, so too would the precise content of the
rights understood to be incorporated by reference into the constitutional text.
Moreover, even assuming broad agreement on a stable conception of human
flourishing, changing material conditions in society might yield new theories
about how to translate that conception into a system of rights recognized by
the state. Embracing this more flexible, and more plausible, understanding of
the nature of the rights protected by the Constitution would free constitutional
exegetes to bring into their analysis the insights of progressive theories of
natural justice—theories that would incorporate the sorts of affirmative
obligations and entitlements that Barnett’s libertarian theory very much tries to
rule out.
Once we start down this path, Barnett’s most startling doctrinal
innovation, the “presumption of liberty,” becomes unnecessary and, indeed,
indefensible. When the only rights that matter are rights to be free from
government interference, Barnett is arguably correct that all government
restraints on liberty labor under a cloud of illegitimacy. But when, for example,
satisfying the economic rights or entitlements of some entail the state’s
restraint on the property rights of others, the grounds for suspicion of
government action across the board, particularly in the economic realm, are
substantially mitigated. If, for example, justice guarantees workers’ rights to
safe working conditions, a living wage, and collective bargaining, the state
cannot act to safeguard that right without at the same time restricting
employers’ contract and property rights. Economic regulation on this view
becomes no different from government regulation of conflicting property
rights through nuisance law—a function that libertarians are happy to ascribe
to the state. When the field of permissible (or obligatory) state action becomes
sufficiently broad, a device like Barnett’s presumption of liberty would tip the
balance too far in favor of a narrow subset of rights at the expense of other
government obligations of equal or greater importance. Rejecting Barnett’s
narrow conception of rights therefore compels a rejection of his dramatic
expansion of judicial authority to second-guess legislative action.
iii. reviving a progressive naturalism?
Barnett deserves a great deal of credit for helping to raise interest in the
potential (even the progressive potential) of natural law constitutional theory,
although I fear that Barnett’s book will reinforce the reflexive tendency to
associate natural law reasoning with the political right. Despite the current
domination of natural law theory by political conservatives, however, natural
law arguments have provided the raw materials for some of the most
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progressive moments in modern American history. As Barnett and others have
observed, the Founding generation was deeply motivated by democratic
commitments drawn from natural law political theory.107 Similarly,
abolitionists drew heavily upon natural law to formulate their jurisprudential
arguments and to justify their civil disobedience against fugitive slave laws.108
More recently, in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, Martin Luther King, Jr.,
turned to the classical natural law tradition to justify his civil disobedience
against, among other things, segregationist practices in Birmingham’s private
businesses.109 And, as Michael Perry has observed, natural law theory provides
a powerful foundation for the pervasive modern discourse of universal human
rights. In Perry’s words, natural law is the very “position presupposed by the
idea of human rights.”110 In light of this long tradition of natural law
progressivism, and despite a renewal of interest in natural law among moral
philosophers and conservative legal thinkers, it is perplexing that the tradition
has been largely disregarded by contemporary progressive legal scholars and
political theorists.
Some people will no doubt worry that the danger that natural law
methodology will engender an untethered judicial activism makes even a
progressive natural law constitutionalism unattractive. To favor a natural law
constitutional theory, however, does not require that one join in Barnett’s call
for a dramatic expansion of judicial power. As I have discussed above, natural
law theory is consistent with a number of rules of recognition and
constitutional hermeneutics. Indeed, there is no inconsistency in
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Id. at 352.
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simultaneously affirming both a natural law political theory and an overriding
commitment to judicial restraint.111 An image of how such a combination might
operate in practice emerges from Robert Cover’s description of antebellum
slavery jurisprudence:
In the judge’s eclectic groping for canons of construction and principles
of exegesis in his work with statutes, in his search for a common law
process, both adequately flexible and sufficiently certain; in his struggle
to adjust conflicting rules and principles of diverse sovereign entities,
he often spoke of the preference for liberty or the natural right of
freedom or the undesirability of slavery. His warrant for making and
applying these judgments was taken to be an “abstract” principle of
natural law. I must stress, however, that almost all of these interesting
and often important applications of natural law and preferences for
liberty were subject to the usual hierarchy of sources for law:
constitutions, statutes, and well-settled precedent.112
One might have wished for a bit more judicial activism regarding slavery’s
constitutional status, but Cover’s discussion makes clear that there is no
intrinsic connection between the natural law’s potent language for talking
about the moral quality of the law and unrestrained judicial power. In other
words, an affirmation of natural law theory is every bit as consistent with the
judicial minimalism advocated by Larry Kramer as it is with the judicial
supremacy favored by Barnett. Following the lead of Lawrence Sager, a
progressive natural lawyer might affirm a broad set of constitutional
entitlements without committing to their full judicial enforcement.113 Failure
by the state to honor those entitlements might sound instead in legal
obligation, justifying acts of protest and civil disobedience, and perhaps even
self-help appropriation, without demanding judicial micromanagement of the
political branches.114
Finally, on a more pragmatic level, at a time when many observers view the
political left as alienated from religious voices and badly in need of a moral
language in which to frame its goals,115 natural law discourse provides the
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possibility of translation. There is no intrinsic connection between natural law,
as a philosophical system, and any particular religious faith. On the other hand,
there is a longstanding practice of reliance on natural law argumentation
within various religious traditions concerning issues of social and legal
significance. Indeed, religious adherents often shift to the language of natural
law when they want to speak to an audience outside their particular faith
tradition.116 Natural law’s ability to speak simultaneously to both secular and
religious audiences points to its unique potential to serve as a unifying
discourse for progressives of various spiritual stripes.
conclusion
There is much to admire in Barnett’s interesting and innovative
contribution to constitutional theory. Nevertheless, his attempt to impose on
federal and state government the straitjacket of Lockean liberalism without
actually defending Lockean political theory is ultimately unconvincing. It’s a
good thing too: Lockean natural rights theory is built on a singularly
implausible conception of the person. Luckily, we are not compelled, either by
our existing Constitution or by the “lost Constitution,” to rely on it. Despite
this, and indeed because of it, Barnett’s book—as well as his difficulty in
containing natural law within the confines of libertarian political theory—is a
welcome reminder of the many potential advantages to be gained from further
developing a progressive natural law constitutional theory.
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